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Can the Law Track Scientific Risk and Technological Innovation?: The Problem of
Regulatory Definitions and Nanotechnology
David A. Dana

Introduction
Nanomaterials containing nanoparticles and nanoparticles themselves are now a
focus of regulatory attention both in the United States and in various jurisdictions throughout
the world. One of the motivations for developing regulation is the body of scientific studies
suggesting that certain nanomaterials could pose environmental, health or safety risks, but
these studies are relatively few in number and involve only a relatively small number of
nanomaterials in particular contexts. The studies indicate that certain nanomaterials pose
possible risks warranting at least some form of supervision by regulators, but they do not
provide a generalized basis for presuming possible risk from all very small – or nanoscale –
materials. The central challenge of developing a regulatory definition for nanomaterials is to
be broad enough that it encompasses those materials that plausibly may exhibit the riskcreating properties that have led to the calls for regulation of nanomaterials in the first place
without sweeping in many materials that plausibly cannot be expected to display such
properties.
An overly broad definition for regulatory purposes is undesirable because it adds to
the regulatory compliance costs of industry without producing corresponding environmental,
health or safety benefits. Moreover, an overly broad definition may result in an information
overload on the part of regulators, which may delay regulators’ ability to evaluate data and to
develop substantive regulatory measures to reduce environmental, health and safety risk. To
borrow from Cass Sunstein, overregulation may lead to under- or ineffective regulation.1
The challenge of developing a regulatory definition that is broad enough to
capture materials that pose possible risks but not so broad as to include many other materials
is made more difficult by the fact that whether a given material displays properties that
warrant regulatory concern is something that probably cannot be known (if it is knowable)
without intensive case-by-case study of the material and its behavior in different
environments. But the development of a regulatory framework, and hence regulatory
definitions, cannot await the completion of such study on every material; indeed, one of the
purposes of establishing a regulatory framework is to determine which materials should be
studied before they are put into use and how much and in what way they should be studied.
Thus, a regulatory definition of nanomaterials and nanoparticles necessarily has to be based
on criteria that screen for likely possible risk or absence of possible risk posed by the
material. Because screening criteria presumably would be and should be shaped with an eye
toward ensuring a margin of safety for human health and the environment, the criteria almost
certainly will include some materials that in fact do not pose any possible risk. But, by the
1
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same token, even the most expansive definition may leave out some materials that may
display properties that suggest possible risk to human health or the environment.
The size of one or more of the dimensions of a material or particles within a
material has been the defining characteristics used not only in the scientific literature but it
also has been the screening criteria employed in all regulatory definitions of nanomaterials to
date.2 However, how size (and what size) should be used as a screening criterion is
debatable, as are the understanding of the number or kinds of dimensions that must meet the
size criteria. Moreover, there are a number of other screening criteria that warrant attention
as possible means of avoiding an overly broad regulatory definition of nanomaterials. These
screening criteria, which this Chapter addresses, include:
(1) whether the material was intentionally produced or engineered;
(2) whether the material has a long history of production and use;
(3) whether the material is intended by its manufacturer for use in a mass production
product and whether the material is intended for application to human skin, or
inhalation or ingestion by human beings; and
(4) whether the material has observable physical characteristics other than size that
suggest either greater or lesser possible risk than would be indicated by size alone.
Achieving flexibility is another challenge inherent in the task of defining
nanomaterials for regulatory purposes.
Any regulatory definition of nanomaterials –
whether it relies on the single criteria of size or a mix of size and other criteria -- should
allow for flexibility, out of recognition of the inherent limits in any screening criteria
approach to defining which materials warrant inclusion in a regulatory framework. One way
of achieving flexibility – and thereby tempering any overinclusion or underinclusion created
by regulatory definitions based on screening criteria -- would be to empower a regulatory
agency (in the U.S. context, presumably the Environmental Protection Agency) to add or
exclude particular materials from the scope of nanomaterials regulation, upon a showing by
the agency of a reasonable basis for concluding that the material does or does not pose a
possible risk of the sort that justifies its inclusion in the regulatory framework for
nanomaterials. As has been done in a number of other regulatory contexts, citizens and
regulated entities could be allowed to petition EPA to include a material or exclude a
material, and the agency could be required to respond to such petitions within a reasonable
time. While an allowance for petitioning carries with it the risk that scarce agency resources
will be absorbed by petitions instead of potentially more important (in terms of health and the
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By regulatory definition I mean a definition proposed or adopted by a government body as part of a mandatory or
voluntary regulatory initiative. Definitions adopted by industry and professional standards organizations such as the
ISO tend to be similar to the proposed or adopted regulatory definitions to date, except that they more often omit
intentionality or engineered component in the definition. It is important to distinguish between scientific definitions,
which are simply the conventional definitions used by scientists; regulatory definitions, which are definition used by
governments for policy purposes; and science-based regulatory definitions, which are regulatory definitions that are
adopted for policy reasons but are informed by the best available science. It would seem uncontroversial that a
desirable regulatory definition would not necessarily track the scientific definitions used by scientists as a matter of
convention, but would take account of available science and therefore be science-based.
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environment) tasks, allowance for petitioning fosters the generation of more data and serves
the important values of public participation and transparency.3
In addition to developing screening criteria that are reasonably well-tailored to
capture those materials that may pose a risk to human health or the environment, and
including flexibility to address the over and under-inclusion inherent in the use of any
screening criteria, there is the challenge of achieving adaptability or reasonable dynamism in
the regulatory definition itself. Nanotechnology has been, and presumably will continue to
be, a rapidly developing field. The number and variety of nanomaterials is ever increasing,
and screening criteria that may be suitable for the existing generation of materials may be
unsuitable for the next generation. Moreover, even if nanomaterials themselves do not
change much in a given time period, scientific understanding of them and tools for evaluating
them may dramatically change.
The process of making formal regulations, including
regulatory definitions, however, is not usually a highly dynamic one. And, in part, for good
reason: A certain degree of stability or “stickiness” in regulatory definitions is desirable
because one of the purposes of regulatory definitions is to allow regulators and regulated
entities to engage in planning, and planning is impeded by uncertainty in the defined scope of
the regulatory framework, Thus, the regulatory regime requires a balance of dynamism with
stability, and should build in measures to promote meaningful and periodic – but not
constant – revisiting of the regulatory definition of nanomaterials.
The Motivations Behind Defining Nanomaterials and Regulatory Definitions to Date
The principal motivation behind the calls for regulatory frameworks for
nanomaterials – and hence the need for a regulatory definition of nanomaterials – relates to
the possibility that their small size may result in behavior that could pose a risk to human
health or the environment. As the report of the EU’s Joint Research Center describes, there
seem to be two distinct concerns. One concern is that very small materials may not behave
differently or display novel behaviors as compared to the same materials in “bulk” or
“coarse” form, but the materials in very small form may be able to permeate barriers in the
human body or other natural systems that were not designed to protect against such small
materials, and these materials thus may enter into areas (such as the human brain) where they
could cause harm.4 This concern does not appear to be inherently limited to materials that
are 100 nanometers or less, and could, depending on the context or environment in which the
material would be introduced, be implicated by larger materials.5 The second concern is that
at very small sizes, the laws of physics apply to particles differently and hence very small
particles can display novel properties that are not found in bulk or coarse versions of the
same elements or chemical compositions. While novel properties can be good and indeed
3
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and Safety Impacts of Nanotechnology: What Research is Needed?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science,
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explain why investments are made to create nanoparticles and nanomaterials, what may be a
good or benign property in some contexts could be risky in others; in addition, materials that
have some desirable, selected-for novel properties could have some undesirable, notunderstood, not-selected-for other novel properties. A recent review of the literature,
however, suggests that novel properties usually characterize only particles that have at least
one dimension of a size of 30 nanometers or less.6
Although a 100 nanometers upper threshold for regulated nanoparticles or
materials containing nanoparticles does not perfectly track these two concerns motivating
calls for nanomaterials regulation, it has been used in all but one of the regulatory definitions
proposed or adopted so far.7 (The single exception is a UK definition that employs 200
nanometers as an upper threshold). Also, with the same exception, the regulatory definitions
to date have only required that one dimension of the material fall below the size threshold.8
The Office of Pesticide Programs of the EPA recently stated that it is using as a working
definition of nanoparticles those particles “that have at least one dimension that measures
between approximately 1 and 100 nanometers.”9 Both the Cosmetics Regulation of the
European Union and proposed EU regulation for novel foods employ a similar definition,
according to which nanomaterials are materials with “one or more dimensions of the order of
100nm”10 or “one or more external dimensions, or an internal structure, on the scale from 1
to 100nm.” 11
Proposed and adopted regulatory definitions of nanomaterials generally require
that the materials have been intentionally produced at the nanoscale or engineered to be
nanoscale or to contain nanoscale particles. An exception to this pattern is the Danish
Ministry of Environment definition, which includes no reference to the concepts of
intentionality/engineered/manufactured, although even that definition suggests that
nanomaterials must be “produced” or “made” as opposed to being naturally occurring.12
What precisely is meant by intentionally produced at the nanoscale or engineered to be
nanoscale has not been extensively addressed by regulatory authorities to date.13
Screening Criteria and Other Components of a Definition
Size
6

M. Auffan et al., Toward a definition of inorganic nanoparticles from an environmental, health and safety
perspective, Nature Nanotechnology 4, 634 (2009), available at
www.nature.com/nnano/journal/v4/full/nnano.2009.242html.
7
The single exception is the definition employed in the voluntary stewardship program of the UK’s Department of
Environment, Food & Rural Affairs, see www.defra.gov.uk. This regulatory definition is notable in requiring that at
least two dimensions fall below the size threshold.
8
However, a Nanotechnology Panel of the American Chemistry Council, an industry group composed of leading
corporations, proposed in February 2007 that “the presence of at least two [nano] dimensions” should be “necessary
to define an engineered nanomaterial.”
9
See http//nanotech.law.bc.com/2010/05/articles/united-states/federal/ppdc-discusses-nanotechno . . .
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Commission proposal for a Regulation on novel foods and amending Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 – 14.1.2008.
11
Regulation (EC) No. 1223/2009.
12
JRC Report, at 3.3.3.
13
See infra. EPA defined “engineered” for purposes of its Nanoscale Materials Stewardship Program as
“purposefully produced” or “purposefully designed to be a nanoscale material,” but that definition does not resolve
all possible ambiguities in the term. See http://www.epa.gov/oppt/nano/nmsp-conceptpper.pdf.
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Size clearly is the principal screening criteria to be used for identifying a set of
materials as posing enough possible risk to be included with a nanomaterials regulatory
framework. The problem with the usual size formula, less than 100 nanometers on one
dimension , is twofold. First, it may not capture some materials that are larger but implicate
the concerns motivating calls for nanomaterials regulation. Second, it may include some
materials that have one nanoscale dimension less than 100 nanometers but that may not
implicate the concerns that motivate the calls for the regulation of nanotechnology. To date,
proposed and adopted regulatory definitions take note of these concerns largely by using the
qualifier “approximately” to describe the size range for materials that would fall under a
regulatory framework. But “approximately” does not provide the notice and precision that
regulated entities need to operate efficiently.
One solution to the upper threshold issue would be to increase the upper threshold
in a regulatory definition of nanomaterials from 100nanometers (perhaps to 300 nanometers
or 1000 nanometers14) but limit that increase to cases in which one of the other screening
criteria discussed below argues in favor of inclusion of the material in the nanomaterials
regulatory framework. For example, one could postulate a general regulatory definition of
nanomaterials as having a 100 nanometers upper threshold but provide that where the
manufacturer of a larger material intended or had engineered the material to have novel
properties due to size or to display novel behavior associated with nanoscale materials, then
the material would be treated as a nanomaterial for purposes of the regulatory framework.
One disadvantage of this approach, suggested below, would be the inherent ambiguity in
defining such an intent and the difficulty of establishing its presence or absence.
A perhaps more promising approach would be to employ a higher upper threshold
for nanomaterials for those materials for which the manufacturer anticipates mass exposure
to the human system, and where, for that reason, the downside of omitting possibly risky
materials from the regulatory framework may be particularly great in terms of human health.
Such products might include food, drugs, cosmetics, and perhaps even pesticides, to the
extent they become incorporated into foods.15 As indicated in the figure below, a relatively
constrained space for regulation of materials between 100 nanometers and 1000 nanometers
could be created by limiting regulation to the intersection of that size range and screening
criteria for materials that were intentional engineering for novel properties and that likely
will have widespread, direct human exposure.

Hybrid, Multicriteria Approach to Upper Threshhold Materials
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The JCR Report suggests an upper limit of 1000nm. The National Organics Standards Board Materials
Committee, convened under the authority of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in a recent statement (February 25,
2010), has suggested an upper limit of 300 nm.
15
The United States’ regulatory regime generally follows this principle: regulatory review is much more oriented
toward pre-market-release demonstrations of safety in the context of drugs and pesticides than it is the context of
industrial chemicals. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulation in the U.S., 6
HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 464 (2000).
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An alternative approach would be to maintain a 100 nanometer threshold in all
contexts but allow the EPA to use rulemaking to add larger materials to the nanomaterials
regulatory framework in cases in which the agency concludes the materials may have novel
properties or display behavior associated with nanoscale materials. As suggested above,
citizen petitions to EPA to include a given material or kind of materials also might be part of
the regime. One task under this approach would be to specify what EPA’s burden would be
in seeking to add materials larger than 100 nanometers to the regulatory framework for
nanomaterials. Such specification could be important in order to avoid de facto delegation to
the courts of the question of the scope of EPA’s discretion in adding larger materials to the
nanomaterials category. Another, related question would be whether EPA would have the
same or different levels of flexibility or discretion in adding greater-than-100-nanometer
material to the scope of regulated nanomaterials than it would in declining a petition to add
such a material.
A similar process could be employed by EPA, with or without prompting by
petitioners, to exclude from nanomaterials regulation those materials that have one dimension
at the nanoscale but not two and that do not implicate the concerns motivating nanomaterials
regulation. Again, an important question would be how much would a petitioner and/or EPA
be required to show regarding the material in order to have it excluded from the scope of
nanomaterials regulation. If too high a burden would be borne by a petitioner, in terms of
testing and data development, then the exemption petition process might not reduce net
compliance costs, which would be one of its purposes of allowing for exclusions via petition
in the first place.
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A Long History of Production and Use
One common approach in environmental regulation is to differentiate between
new substances – those created after the date a new regulation was adopted – and old or
existing ones that were created before the date of enactment. The new/old distinction, which
pervades such major environmental statutes as the Clean Air Act, usually does not exempt
older or existing substances from regulation but provides for relatively less stringent
regulation for them. The new/old framework also can be used to explain the decision not to
require any testing or lesser testing under such statutes as the Food and Drug Act and TSCA
for a substance if that substance is considered sufficiently similar to an old or existing and
approved substance as opposed to being a new substance that would require new testing and
new regulatory approval.16
Indeed, both the Food and Drug Administration and the EPA at one point invoked
this new/old notion to explain why nanomaterials might not require testing, i.e. to the extent
nanomaterials contained the same chemical elements as drugs or chemicals that had been
approved in bulk or coarse form, the nanomaterials might be regarded as part of an old or
existing drug or chemical and hence would not trigger the requirements for new drugs or new
chemicals. This treatment of nanomaterials has been controversial, in part because the
concern about nanomaterials is that they may have novel properties that are not shared with
their bulk or coarse counterparts. Moreover, EPA has suggested it may take a more
aggressive approach toward nanomaterials under TSCA using its new use and other
authorities, and pending legislation in Congress would specifically allow EPA to designate a
chemical as “new” on grounds other than molecular identity, such as, presumably, size.17
The new/old distinction can be useful in fashioning a regulatory definition for
nanomaterials in the sense that it gives some precedential grounding for carving out an
exception to the regulatory definition for nanomaterials for those materials that were in
production and use long before the last twenty years and the emergence of nanotechnology as
a distinct field. For these historically-produced and long-used materials, there is no reason –
and indeed no suggestion by anyone in the literature – that such materials pose possible
environmental, health or safety risk.
These historical materials include carbon black and a variety of materials used in
food production, including the production of homogenized milk and mayonnaise. Although
some or all of these materials might be excluded by a definition of nanomaterials that
requires that nanomaterials have been “engineered,” as the JRC Report suggests,18 that is not
obviously the case, so an explicit exclusion for materials produced prior to a plausible date
(e.g. 1980 or 1990) might be preferable.
Intentionality/Engineered

16

See J. Clarence Davies, Oversight of Next Generation Nanotechnology (April 18, 2008), available at
www.nanotechproject.org/publications.
17
See Control of Nanoscale Materials under the Toxic Substances Control Act, available at
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/nano; Safe Chemicals Act of 2010, sec. 4(1)©.
18
JRC Report, at 4.2.6.
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That nanomaterials for regulatory purposes be intentionally produced or
engineered at the nanoscale is important for several reasons. First, because an entity is
unlikely to intentionally produce something at the nanoscale unless the material is expected
to have novel properties, intentionally produced or engineered material are likely to display
novel properties. It is precisely such materials that implicate the concerns about unusual
particle behavior that motivate the calls for the development of a regulatory framework for
nanomaterials. Materials that are produced at a nanoscale inadvertently or by accident are
less likely to be characterized by novel properties. Second, because very small, nano-like,
materials are not easy to detect unless one is trying to image and track them, a company that
unintentionally produces nanoscale materials might not realize as much.
That said, there are difficulties in tying a regulatory definition to a concept of
“intentionality” or “engineered,” because it can be hard to know what is precisely meant by
the concept, at least in the absence of a clear definition. Does intentional production include
production where the manufacturer reasonably should have known it was creating a
nanoscale material but for whatever reason did not know? Does intentional production, for
example, include the production of a nanoscale material that is an incidental byproduct of the
production of another non-nanoscale material if the manufacturer if in fact aware of the
byproduct and its nanoscale dimensions? Does intentional or engineered production mean
that the manufacturer intended that a material have novel properties associated with
nanoscale as opposed to bulk or coarse counterparts? And if a concept of novel properties is
implicated or implicit in the intentional production or engineered component of a definition,
how are novel properties to be defined? As one commentator has noted:
While the “novel properties” concept rests at the center of much industry interest
in nanotechnology, it also presents material characterization and regulatory
problems. What exactly are these “novel properties”? How are they defined? Are
they consistent from one type of nanomaterial to the next? Do they vary in
intensity under certain circumstances, and are they measurable and capable of
standardization? If not, how are scientists, regulators, and attorneys going to
handle this aspect of the definition of nanotechnology when it comes to material
characterization of projects and/or regulations?19
The preceding discussion is not mean to suggest that the concept of intentional
production or engineered as part of a regulatory definition be abandoned. Rather, our
suggestion is that care be paid to elaborating what is meant and not meant to be included
within the intentional production or engineered concept at the time of the formulation of the
regulatory definition in order to avoid possible disputes in the future.

Scope and Intensity of Intended Human Exposure
There is an intuitive argument for a broader or more expansive regulatory
framework for nanomaterials in the context of their use in products or processes that by
definition will entail large-scale, intimate exposure to human beings, as would be the case
19
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with nanomaterials in foods, food packaging, drugs and cosmetics. By contrast, when a
material is not being produced for use in a mass market product and/or is intended only for
use in an arena of relatively limited and controlled human exposure, there may be an
argument for the application of a de-minimis-risk-based exclusion from an otherwise
applicable regulatory definition of nanomaterials. A nanomaterial that is being produced in
very tiny amounts for use in the construction of equipment for outer space, for example,
could fall in such a de minimis exception.
The difficulties of fashioning an acceptable de minimis exception, however, are
several. For one thing, a material that is initially intended not for mass marketing or human
consumption could be re-directed to such uses at a later date; moreover, materials can come
into close human contact through the process of disposal and subsequent absorption into the
environment (e.g., via leaching into a drinking water supply). Moreover, it is not
immediately obvious what metric could be used for a de minimis exception in the
nanomaterials context: in the EU’s Research, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of
Chemicals (REACH) regulation, there is an implicit exclusion from registration requirements
for any chemicals for which less than a ton is produced or imported annually in the EU.20
But mass (or volume) is not easily translatable into the nano-world of very tiny, very light
particles.

Physical Characteristics Other Than Size
It is widely acknowledged that certain physical characteristics of nanomaterials –
such as surface area, active site density or reactivity – may be more predictive of whether the
materials will display novel properties than size.21 Ideally, then, one might want to use these
characteristics as screening criteria instead of size or along with size, but the understanding
of these characteristics is not yet well-developed, and there are not widely-accepted methods
or metrics for measuring and comparing these characteristics. In the near term, therefore, the
best that can be done is to assemble some kind of regulatory working group to actively assess
the developing literature regarding these characteristics, with an eye to identifying what
would be required to be done (in research terms) to make it possible to incorporate these nonsize, physical characteristics into a workable regulatory definition of nanomaterials.

Distinguishing Among Nanomaterials
While some attention now is being paid to the important issue of how to
differentiate nanomaterials from other (not nano) materials for purposes of regulation, there
has not been any attention paid to how to differentiate one particular nanomaterial or
nanoparticle from another nanomaterial or nanoparticle for purposes of regulation. In a
20

Despite its one tonne per year threshold, the European Commission since at least December 2006 has expressed
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regulatory framework, there will presumably be some sort of requirement to register each
distinct nanomaterial or nanoparticle.22 In order to know how to go about such registration,
regulated entities will need to know when it is permissible to group different materials or
particles as the same for regulatory purposes and when that is impermissible. In the
nanotechnology context, this is a challenging task because the usual means of differentiating
materials – chemical composition, molecular identity – will not necessarily capture relevant
differences. Indeed, two nanomaterials that have the same chemical composition and size but
a different physical configuration and/or coating may exhibit different behaviors.23 In order
to define one nanomaterial as different from another, therefore, a better understanding of
novel behaviors and what drives them will need to be developed.

Regulatory Definition as Adaptive Management
The whole enterprise of regulating nanotechnology – and hence the included
enterprise of defining nanomaterials for regulatory purposes – ideally would be an exercise in
“adaptive management,” understood generally to mean management that continually adapts
to take account of new information and new insights. Adaptive management in this context
– as in most regulatory contexts – must grapple with the truth that regulated entities need
some stability to operate, and stability means some periods of relative non-adaptation, as well
as the truth that regulators, perpetually overworked and overburdened and at least at some
remove from developments in science and industry, may not engage in even periodic
adaptation unless institutional structures are in place to encourage them to do so.24
One such institutional means would be an agency commitment to issue a review
of its regulatory definition no less than once every five years, in which EPA would be
required to explain why it was or was not changing the current regulatory definition at a
minimum of five year intervals. The process of putting out such a review for notice and
comment would help focus debate on changes in nanotechnology that might justify changes
in the regulatory definition of nanomaterials. Another institutional means would be the
creation of an advisory board to inform EPA regarding relevant changes in the
nanotechnology industry, and composed of industry, academic, and NGO representatives.
One challenge for such an advisory board – and for EPA generally – would be to address
confidential business information concerns that might discourage industry from sharing with

22

For example, while the European Commissions’ recent report suggests a dossier must be prepared for each
“composition” that is a nanomaterial under REACH, it does not offer any guidance as to how a manufacturer could
determine whether two similar materials are the same composition of nanomaterial for this purpose or rather
different nanomaterials requiring the completion of separate dossiers. See ECHA, IUCLID 5 Guidance and Support
Nanomaterials in IUCLID 5.2 (June 10 v 1.0), at 5.
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See, e.g. , Byoung-Kye Kim et al., The effect of metal cluster coatings on carbon nanotubes, 2006
NANOTECHNOLOGY 17, 496.
24
On regulatory inertia, see David E. Adelman, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN L REV 1796, 1826 (2008).
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EPA information regarding its investments in emerging forms of nanotechnology, for fear
that doing so might result in the loss of protection for confidential business information.25
Conclusion
Nanomaterials cannot be defined without reference to size, but a pure size-based
definition is likely to be under- and over-inclusive for regulatory purposes. In the near term,
size needs to be blended with other screening criteria such as scope of human exposure to
create a regulatory net that captures the riskiest materials without imposing heavy regulatory
costs on producers of very small materials that pose relatively limited risks to human and
environmental health. In the longer term, as we come to better understand nanomaterials and
their distinctive behaviors, we should define them around their distinctive behaviors directly
and the risks those behaviors pose. Nanomaterials, more generally, require a dynamic, fluid
definition that accounts for the fact that they have been and will continue to be rapidly
developed and the fact that they can be distinguished from one another on a range of
dimensions and not just chemical identity or size. The challenge of defining nanomaterials
thus embodies the broader challenge of making regulation work in an age of fast-paced, even
frenetic technological change.

25

See Sunstein, supra, at 420 (noting that “Government is rarely in a good position to know what sorts of
innovations are likely to be forthcoming.”). Confidential business information is a challenge for the regulation of
emerging technologies, and one that so far has not received due attention in the academic literature. In forthcoming
work I hope to explore possible solutions to the dilemma of developing regulation in the context of confidential
information concerns. There are two principal problems embedded in the problem of confidential information: (1)
the fear of business entities that they will lose the legal protection under (primarily) state law when they submit
confidential business information to the government, and (2) the fear of business entities that they competitors will
be able to use their disclosures to government to develop competing products. The first concern could be addressed
with a federal statute that preserves state confidential information status notwithstanding disclosure to federal
agencies. The second concern is more difficult to address, as it is essentially a practical one and not a legal one. To
be effective and achieve public trust, the federal government in the U.S. context would need to reveal the bases for
its regulatory responses, including information it received from businesses, and by doing so, the possibility of
leakage of information from one business to its competitors becomes almost impossible to avoid. However, there
may be ways for government to share information with the public and other governments that minimize the risks of
such leakage, such as the use of redaction. Another possibility would be to substitute general public access and
review to underlying submissions by businesses to certified representatives of the public, such as specially
designated non-governmental organizations.
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